Quantum Multiverses by Hartle, James B.
Quantum Multiverses∗
James B. Hartle†
Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501 and
Department of Physics, University of California,Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9530
(Dated: January 29, 2018)
Abstract
A quantum theory of the universe consists of a theory of its quantum dynamics (H) and a theory
of its quantum state (Ψ). The theory (H,Ψ) predicts quantum multiverses in the form of decoher-
ent sets of alternative histories describing the evolution of the universe’s spacetime geometry and
matter content. A small part of one of these histories is observed by us. These consequences follow:
(a) The universe generally exhibits different quantum multiverses at different levels and kinds of
coarse graining. (b) Quantum multiverses are not a choice or an assumption but are consequences
of (H,Ψ) or not. (c) Quantum multiverses are generic for simple (H,Ψ). (d) Anthropic selection
is automatic because observers are physical systems within the universe not somehow outside it.
(e) Quantum multiverses can provide different mechanisms for the variation constants in effective
theories (like the cosmological constant) enabling anthropic selection. (f) Different levels of coarse
grained multiverses provide different routes to calculation as a consequence of decoherence. We
support these conclusions by analyzing the quantum multiverses of a variety of quantum cosmo-
logical models aimed at the prediction of observable properties of our universe. In particular we
show how the example of a multiverse consisting of a vast classical spacetime containing many
pocket universes having different values of the fundamental constants arises automatically as part
of a quantum multiverse describing an eternally inflating false vacuum that decays by the quan-
tum nucleation of true vacuum bubbles. In a FAQ we argue that the quantum multiverses of the
universe are scientific, real, testable, falsifiable, and similar to those in other areas of science even
if they are not directly observable on arbitrarily large scales.
∗ A pedagogical essay.
†Electronic address: hartle@physics.ucsb.edu
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I. INTRODUCTION
The universe may present us with an ensemble of alternative possible situations only one
of which is observed by us. In this paper we call such an ensemble a ‘multiverse’.
A much discussed classical example of a multiverse is a single, vast cosmological space-
time containing ‘pocket universes’ at different locations. Physics inside different pockets is
assumed to be governed by different low energy effective theories. For example, the effective
theories could differ in the value of the cosmological constant Λ. This is a multiverse of
pockets with different values of Λ, only one which is observed by us — the one we live in.
For short, we call this a pocket multiverse. Only small values Λ <∼ 10−120 are consistent with
the rest of our cosmological data including a description of us as physical systems within
the universe and the formation of galaxies by the present age (e.g.[1–3]). Had we not yet
measured Λ we would predict that our pocket has a value in this small range1. This is a
simple example of anthropic selection. We won’t observe properties of a universe where we
cannot exist. We will discuss this essentially classical example in a quantum mechanical
context in in Section V.
Quantum theories of a closed system like the universe provide multiverses in the form
of decoherent sets of alternative coarse-grained histories of the universe2. Such sets are are
quantum multiverses in the sense of the first sentence in this paper — an ensemble of possible
histories only one of which is observed by us. Quantum mechanics predicts probabilities for
which of the individual members of the ensemble of histories happens starting from from
theories of the universe’s dynamics (H) and quantum state (Ψ). When these probabilities are
conditioned on a description of our observational situation (including us) we get probabilities
for what we observe of the universe.
Quantum multiverses have been discussed extensively in connection with the fundamen-
1 Some might restrict the term ‘multiverse’ to just this example, but in our opinion there is clarity and
simplicity in our more general definition.
2 In much other work we have called decoherent sets of alternative coarse grained histories ‘realms’. In this
paper we use ‘multiverse’.
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tals of quantum mechanics3. This essay is devoted to discussing quantum multiverses in
the context of quantum cosmology. We will illustrate the idea in simple concrete, calculable
models based on the author’s joint work with Stephen Hawking and Thomas Hertog calcu-
lating the predictions for observations of the no-boundary wave function proposal [7] for Ψ
(mainly [3, 8–10]). We shall show how predicting the results of our observations is enabled
by quantum mechanics. In particular, we shall show how a pocket multiverse emerges from
an appropriate (H,Ψ).
These models support the following conclusions about quantum multiverses in general:
a. Many Quantum Multiverses. The theory (H,Ψ) does not predict just one multiverse
of alternative histories. It predicts many different multiverses at different levels and kinds
of coarse graining. All are available for prediction.
b. Quantum multiverses are Not a Choice. Quantum multiverses are not a choice or
an assumption separate from the theory (H,Ψ). Rather they follow or do not follow from
(H,Ψ).
c. Quantum Multiverses are Generic. Simple, manageable, discoverable theories (H,Ψ)
generically predict quantum multiverses with many histories. To predict just one history
with certainty all of present complexity would have to be encoded (H,Ψ). Rather we expect
that the that present complexity arose not just from (H,Ψ), but through a multiverse of
histories that describe frozen accidents that occurred over the course of the universe’s history
— chance events that could have gone one way or the other for which the consequences of
the way it did go proliferated. The accidents of biological evolution are an example.
d. Anthropic Selection is Automatic. Anthropic selection is an automatic consequence
of quantum mechanical probabilities for observations. This because observers are physical
systems within the universe not somehow outside it. Probabilities for our observations are
conditioned on a description of our observational situation and we won’t observe what is
where we cannot exist. Anthropic reasoning does not rely on some anthropic principle and
is not a choice to be be made or not made. It is an automatic consequence of calculating
probabilities for observations.
3 See for example the discussions in [4–6].
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e. Quantum multiverses provide several mechanisms for the constants of effective theories
to vary. The pocket universe considered above concerns one history with Λ varying from
place to place. But there are (H,Ψ) leading to multiverses of spatially homogeneous histories
with Λ the same at all places in each history but differing from history to history also enabling
anthropic selection. We will provide examples of both mechanisms in Sections V and VII.
f. Two Routes to Coarse-Graining. Quantum multiverses are restricted to sets of alter-
native coarse grained histories that are decoherent — that is, restricted to sets that have
negligible quantum interference between the individual histories in the set as a consequence
of (H,Ψ). This ensures that the probabilities are consistent with the rules of probability
theory [11]. Further coarse graining can be carried out either by summing probabilities or
by summing quantum amplitudes. That can be a considerable computational advantage as
we illustrate by example in Section V.
Understanding multiverses as decoherent sets of alternative coarse-grained histories of a
quantum universe can help address some of the concerns, objections, that have been raised
about multiverses. Multiverses arise naturally and inevitably in quantum theory as well as
many other areas of science. The author’s views on some of the concerns are given in the
FAQ in Appendix A.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II uses two-slit model closed systems to
describe the decoherent (or consistent) histories formulation of quantum mechanics (DH)
which we use throughout. Sections III -VIII present the five model quantum cosmologies
and their quantum multiverses on which we base our conclusions above. Conclusions are in
Section IX. The FAQ in Appendix A briefly addresses some of the concerns and objections
that have been raised concerning multiverses. A further appendix B gives more details about
DH beyond those in Section II.
II. QUANTUM MECHANICS FOR THE UNIVERSE ILLUSTRATED IN TWO-
SLIT MODELS
This section uses three models based on the two-slit experiment to illustrate how differ-
ent quantum multiverses can arise in the same physical situation illustrating points (a)-(d)
of the Introduction. We assume the decoherent or consistent histories formulation of the
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quantum mechanics of a closed system such as the universe4. Decoherent histories quantum
theory (DH) is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent
with the rest of modern physics such as special relativity and quantum field theory, general
enough for histories, general enough for cosmology, and generalizable to include semiclassical
quantum gravity. Copenhagen quantum mechanics is contained within DH as an approx-
imation appropriate for measurement situations. DH can be thought of as an extension,
clarification, and, to some extent, a completion of the program started by Everett [13]. DH
may not be the only formulation of quantum mechanics with these properties but it is the
only one we have at present.
The basic ideas of DH that will be needed in this paper can be introduced with three
model two-slit situations each in a closed box — three very simple model universes. We will
illustrate a variety of quantum multiverses with these simple situations. The three models
are illustrated in Figure 1. We discuss these informally with a minimum of equations in this
section. The same discussion with more equations can be found in Appendix B.
TSS: In the first model the box contains an electron gun at left that emits an electron
which moves through a screen with two slits S = (U,L) to arrive at a further screen at right
in one of a set of position intervals Y = (1, 2, 3 · · · ). We call this the “simple two-slit model
(TSS)”.
TSG: In the second model, in addition to the the contents of TSS, there is a gas of particles
near the slits. These scatter off the electron weakly enough not to disturb its motion but
strongly enough to carry away phases. The gas particles constitute an environment for the
electron in the sense discussed by [14–16] and many others. We call this the “two-slit with
gas model (TSG)”.
TSGO: In the third model the gas particles in TSG have an observable color — red near
the upper slit and blue near the lower one. The electron is replaced by an observer moving
through the slits — so the box must be very large! In these respects the model is closer to
the real universe where observers are physical systems within the universe and not somehow
outside. We call this the “two-slit with gas and observer model (TSGO)”. Figure 2 is a more
evocative image of this.
We stress that in all three examples the boxes are closed — like the universe. There
4 For classic references see [11]. For a tutorial see, e.g. [12].
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FIG. 1: Three idealized model closed systems based on the two-slit setup. The top model (TSS)
is just the familiar two-slit example. The second model (TSG) includes a gas of particles in the
vicinity of the slits that scatter weakly off the electron as it passes through. The third model
(TSGO) considers a very large box of this kind with an observer who can pass through the slits
(Figure 2). The gas particles have a distinguishable color detectable by the observer — red near
the upper slit and blue near the lower one. The probabilities for detection in an interval Y on the
far screen is indicated schematically in the graphs on the right.
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are no observers outside the box looking at the inside, or measuring what goes on there, or
otherwise meddling with the inside. Any observers are physical systems within a box as in
the TSGO model.
The inputs to the prediction of quantum multiverses are the box’s Hamiltonian H and its
quantum state |Ψ(t)〉. The latter is a function of time in the Schro¨dinger picture in which
we work. The state can be defined by specifying the a wave function of the electron at the
initial time when it leaves the gun. This state evolves to later times by the Schro¨dinger
equation as electron moves through the box. Starting in this way branch state vectors can
be constructed for the individual members of sets of alternative histories of the the electron’s
motion through the box. The set is decoherent when all the branches are approximately
mutually orthogonal. Probabilities for histories are then the norms of the branch state
vectors. The computation of these will be described qualitatively in this section; more
mathematical details are described in Appendix B. We move back and forth between wave
functions like (B1) and bras and kets like |Ψ(t)〉 as convenient.
A. Simple Two Slit Model (TSS)
Two sets of coarse-grained histories are readily identified. There is the set of alternative
histories defined by which position interval Y the electron arrives at the screen at time td. A
finer grained set of histories is defined by also specifying the slit S that the electron passes
through on the way to Y . An even finer-grained set of alternative histories would specify the
path the electron takes at each moment of time, but just the first two sets will be sufficient
to illustrate what we need.
Do these two sets of histories define different quantum multiverses that TSS exhibits?
Not yet! We still have to check that the sets are decoherent, that is, that the squares of
their amplitudes that give probabilities that are consistent with the usual rules of probability
theory.
A branch state vector corresponds to each of the histories in a set of alternative ones.
Consider, for example, the set where the histories are labeled only by the different values Y
at the screen. The branch state vectors for this set are
|ΨY (td)〉 ≡ PY |Ψ(td)〉, Y = 1, 2, 3, · · · (2.1)
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where PY is the (Schro¨dinger picture) projection operator onto the range of position corre-
sponding to arrival in Y . The collection of projection operators for different Y obey
PY PY ′ = δY Y ′PY ,
∑
Y
PY = I (2.2)
capturing the idea that the electron must arrive at one or another of the intervals. As a
consequence, the branch state vectors are orthogonal and sum to the state
〈ΨY (td)|ΨY ′(td)〉 = 0, Y 6= Y ′,
∑
Y
|ΨY 〉 = |Ψ〉. (2.3)
The orthogonality means that there is vanishing quantum interference between the branch
state vectors. This set of histories is therefore decoherent. The probabilities p(Y ) for arrival
at an interval Y are
p(Y ) = || |ΨY (td)〉 ||2 = || |PY |Ψ(td)〉 ||2. (2.4)
Now, let’s consider the finer grained set of histories which specify which slit the electron
passed through in addition to where it arrives at the far screen. The branch state vectors
for these histories can be constructed in the same way as in the above example. At the time
ts when the electron passes through the slits define
|ΨS(ts)〉 ≡ PS|Ψ(ts)〉 (2.5)
where PS is a projection on a region around slit S, either U or L. Evolve these vectors to
the time td and project on the different regions Y to find the branch state vectors
|ΨY S(td)〉 ≡ PY |ΨS(td)〉 (2.6)
for the histories that went through slit S and arrived at interval Y . Evidently∑
S
|ΨY S〉 = |ΨY 〉. (2.7)
Unlike the previous example, this set of histories does not decohere. Vanishing overlap
does not follow from the orthogonality of the projections expressed in (2.2). Indeed, the
quantum interference between these branches is directly responsible in the classic two-slit
interference pattern.
It would be inconsistent to try assign probabilities to this set of alternative histories.
The probability to arrive at Y should be the sum of the probability to go through U and
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arrive at Y and the probability to go through L and arrive at Y . But in quantum mechanics
probabilities are squares of amplitudes and
|| |ΨY 〉||2 = || |ΨY U(td)〉+ |ΨY L(td)〉 ||2 6= || |ΨY U(td)〉 ||2 + || |ΨY L(td)〉 ||2 (2.8)
because of quantum interference.
Thus, the finer-grained set following both Y and S does not give us a further quantum
multiverse because it is not decoherent. In Copenhagen quantum mechanics we would
have said that there are no probabilities for S because probabilities are assigned only to the
outcomes of measurements and we didn’t measure which slit the electron went through. The
Copenhagen approximation is consistent with DH because measured alternatives decohere
(e.g. [17, 18]). But decoherence is a more general, more observer independent criterion for
assigning probabilities that apply to histories of the universe as a whole.
B. Two-slit Model with Gas (TSG):
TSG differs from TSS only in the presence of the weakly interacting gas. The weak
interaction with the gas means the set of histories coarse grained only by different values
Y will decohere and and have nearly identical probabilities to the same set of histories in
TSS. But there will be a significant difference between TSS and TSG for a set of histories
that follows S as well as Y . The branch state vectors (2.6) must now include the degrees of
freedom of the scattering particles. Scattering from the upper slit leads to as different state
of the gas than scattering from the lower slit. If enough gas particles scatter these states
can be nearly orthogonal leading decoherence of the set of histories that follows both S and
Y . This argument is given more quantitatively in Appendix B
Thus for TSG we have exhibited two multiverses at different levels of coarse graining.
The first one (just Y ) is a coarse graining of the second (Y, S). The first ignores the gas,
the second follows it.
Which of these two multiverses really describes the box model universe? Both of them.
They are descriptions of the same system at different levels of coarse graining. Which of the
two descriptions should be used to calculate the probability p(Y ) that the electron arrives
at interval Y on the far screen? Either of them because they both supply probabilities that
are consistent with one another.
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Useful descriptions of a physical system at different levels of coarse graining are familiar
from statistical mechanics. A fine-grained description of a box of gas would specify the
position and momentum of every particle in the box. A much coarser but more useful
description specifies only the total energy, angular momentum, and number of particles in
the box. These differ greatly in utility and computational complexity.
This model illustrates two of the conclusions in the Introduction. First (a) even for simple
systems like TSG the theory (H,Ψ) will predict many different multiverses at different levels
and kinds of coarse graining. The two illustrated here are compatible in the sense that one
is a coarse graining of the other. But that does not have to be the case. The universe may
exhibit incompatible coarse grainings for which there is no finer grained decoherent set of
which they are both coarse grainings (think position and momentum.) (See, e.g [17]).
The model also illustrates conclusion (b) in the Introduction that multiverses are not a
choice or an assumption. The possible multiverses follow from the the basic theory of the
two-slit experiment. You can choose one multiverse or another to calculate with, but you
can’t choose whether the theory exhibits them or not.
The model also illustrates conclusion (f) in the Introduction. The equivalence of coarse
graining by summing quantum amplitudes with coarse graining by summing probabilities is
one way of stating the consistency between different sets that is a consequence of decoherence.
The TSG model gives a specific example. Suppose that we are interested in the probability
p(Y ) that the electron arrives in interval Y . This can be written in two different ways as a
consequence of decoherence
p(Y ) =
∑
S
p(Y, S) =
∑
S
|| |ΨY S〉||2, (sum probabilities) (2.9a)
p(Y ) = || |ΨY 〉||2 = ||
∑
S
|ΨY S〉||2 (sum amplitudes) (2.9b)
The first is coarse graining by summing probabilities for histories, the second is coarse
graining by summing amplitudes for histories. Which of these formulae should be used to
calculate p(Y )? It doesn’t make any difference, they both give the same answer because the
probabilities are consistent as a consequence of decoherence. Summing amplitudes is usually
easier than summing probabilities because less computation is involved. This is a triviality
in this example but, as we will illustrate in Section VI, this simplicity is a considerable
advantage in physically complex situations.
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C. Two-slit Model with Gas and Observer (TSGO)
1. Third and First Person Probabilities
TSS and TSG have quantum multiverses that provide probabilities for which of a set of
alternative histories happens in the box whether or not they are subject to the attention of
observers. These probabilities for which history happens are called third person probabilities
and are derivable just from (H,Ψ). As observers of the universe we are interested in the
probabilities for what we observe. To discuss this TSGO includes a model observer as a
physical system within the box and assumes that the gas particles of TSS have a detectable
color — red near the upper slit and blue near the lower slit. See Figure 2.
An observer moves through the two-slit setup (which must be very large) equipped with
a detector that can measure the color of any gas detected. If the detector registers ‘red’ the
observer knows that she is passing through the upper slit. Given this data red, or what is the
same thing, given that she passed through U , what does she predict for the probability that
she will arrive in the interval Y at the further screen. This is an example of a first person
probability — a probability for the result of an observation 5. First person probabilities are
third person probabilities for what happens conditioned on data that describes observational
situation. In this case, the observer’s data is that she passed through the upper slit U . The
first person probability that she observes Y at the further screen is then
p(1p)(Y ) = p(Y |U) = p(Y, U)
p(U)
=
||PY |ΨU(td)〉||2
|| |ΨU(td)〉||2 . (2.10)
The distribution is illustrated in bottom image in Figure 1. As should be clear from com-
paring that with the figure immediately above what is most probable to occur is not the
most probable to be observed.
2. Anthropic Selection
Up to now we have tacitly assumed in TSGO that a live observer (us) exists (E) in the
box for all times in all cases. Since an observer is a physical system within the box there is a
5 In other work we have called first person probabilities ‘bottom up probabilities’ and third person proba-
bilities ‘top-down probabilities’ [19] and especially [20]
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FIG. 2: A more evocative figure of an observer going through a two-slit experiment. The observer
is passing through the lower slit detecting particles of the blue gas which is in her vicinity.
third person probability for it to exist (E) or not exist (E¯). Our data as observers trivially
includes E.
As an example of the consequences of this, of consider histories specified by both Y and
S. But suppose that the red radiation is lethal to any observer passing through the upper
slit. When we arrive at an interval Y at the far screen we have data (Y,E). What are the
probabilities, given that data, that we got there6 by going through U or L? Evidently (and
trivially) these probabilities are
p(1p)(U) = p(U |Y,E) = 0, p(1p)(L) = p(L|Y,E) = 1. (2.11)
This is an example of automatic anthropic selection — point d) in the Introduction. We
wouldn’t arrive at Y if we had gone through the lower slit. No ‘anthropic principle’ had to
be invoked, no extra ingredient added to (H,Ψ). We just calculated the probabilities for
what we observe. For more of a discussion of living in a superposition like the observer in
this model see [22].
6 This is thus a very simple example of a probability for our past history of the kind that is unavailable in
Copenhagen quantum mechanics but which is essential in cosmology as we see in Section VII, See, e.g.
[21]
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III. FIVE EXEMPLARY QUANTUM COSMOLOGICAL MULTIVERSES
The most striking observable feature of our quantum universe is its classical spacetime.
At some level and kind of coarse graining this extends over the whole of the visible universe
from near the big bang to the distant future. What is the origin of this realm of classi-
cal predictability in a quantum theory characterized fundamentally by indeterminacy and
distributed probabilities? How does it emerge from theory (H,Ψ) that includes quantum
gravity where spacetime geometry is generally fluctuating and without definite value? Many
of our cosmological observations are of properties of the universe’s classical spacetime and
its contents — the expansion, the approximate homogeneity and isotropy on large scales,
the distribution of galaxies, the CMB, the value of the cosmological constant, etc.
Classical behavior is not a given in a quantum universe. It is a matter of quantum
probabilities. A quantum system behaves classically when, in a suitable quantum multiverse
of alternative histories, the probabilities are high for those histories exhibiting correlations in
time governed by deterministic laws. The relevant probabilities follow from (H,Ψ). Classical
spacetime emerges when the probabilities are high for spacetime geometries correlated in
time by the Einstein equation7.
Subsequent sections III through VIII exhibit five models of a quantum multiverse of
classical spacetimes that illustrate conclusions (a)-(f) of the Introduction. The models are
based on the author’s joint work with Stephen Hawking and Thomas Hertog (mainly [3, 8–
10]). We do not pretend to present these models in the depth and precision that they are
discussed in those papers. Rather, we present a qualitative and intuitive descriptions of the
models.
A. Common Elements
The five models have the following elements in common:
7 The rest of the domain of applicability of classical physics constituting the quasiclassical realm of every
day experience is a consequence of this [23].
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1. General Theory
Semiclassical Quantum Gravity:— Quantum multiverses of the universe necessarily in-
clude alternative histories of cosmological spacetime geometry and therefore involve quantum
gravity at some approximate level. Phenomena like the emergence of classical spacetime from
the quantum big bang, the generation of large scale structure from quantum fluctuations
away from homogeneity and isotropy, the nucleation of bubbles of true vacuum in a false
vacuum, and eternal inflation are all fundamentally quantum spacetime phenomena. We
discuss these treating quantum gravity in semiclassical approximation.
Quantum State: For the quantum state Ψ we adopt the no-boundary wave function of
the universe (NBWF) in its semiclassical approximation [7].
Dynamics: For a theory of dynamics (H) we assume Einstein gravity coupled to a single
homogeneous scalar field φ(t) moving in a potential V (φ). Different models have different
V (φ)
Coarse Graining: The theory (H,Ψ) predicts different quantum multiverses defined by
coarse grainings that follow different variables on very different scales. Coarse grainings
relevant for laboratory experiment follow the outcomes of the experiment and ignore cosmo-
logical scale features of the universe if these do not affect the outcomes. Coarse grainings
relevant for cosmology follow the large scale features of the universe and ignore small scale
fluctuations like planets, biota, human observers, and their laboratory experiments whose
presence or absence has little effect on the large scale behavior of the universe.
A Model of Observers and Observation: By itself, the theory (H,Ψ) predicts third person
probabilities for which of a set of alternative histories of classical spacetime geometries and
the matter within happens. First person probabilities for our observations are third person
probabilities for what happened conditioned on the data D describing our observational
situation. TSGO provided a very simple example of this leading to (2.10) and(2.11). There,
the data D was that an observer existed, E. Naturally probabilities for the results of her
observations were conditioned in E.
As observers of the universe we, and the apparatus we use, are quantum physical systems
within it not somehow outside it. Our observations of the universe are limited to a spatial
volume of rough size c/(Hubble constant) ∼ 4000Mpc at the present time — our Hubble
volume. This is just one Hubble volume in a universe that may have a great many similar
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volumes. We have only a very, very small probability that we denote by pE(D) to have
evolved in any Hubble volume. Incorporating, as it does, the probabilities for accidents of
biological evolution, the probability pE(D) is a very, very, very small number much beyond
the ability of present day physics to compute. This is a very crude model of an observing
situation, but still better than many treatments where the evolution of observing systems
in the universe is not considered at all.8
Despite the small value of pE(D) there can be a significant probability that in a very
large universe the data D is replicated in many Hubbble volumes. First person probabilities
for our observations are third person probabilities for what happened conditioned on the
existence of at least one instance of our observational situation — our instance. That’s all
we know for sure about instances of D. We abbreviate (at least one instance of D) by D≥1.
TSGO provided a very simple example of this leading to (2.10) and(2.11).
The bottom line is that first person probabilities for an observable feature of the universe
O are third person probabilities for O to happen from (H,Ψ) conditioned on the existence
of at least one instance of our observational situation D, viz
p(1p)(O) ≡ p(O|D≥1) (3.1)
We describe how to calculate this in the various models beginning with the one in the
next section.
IV. A QUANTUM MULTIVERSE OF HOMOGENEOUS, ISOTROPI, CLASSI-
CAL HISTORIES
This is a very simple model that illustrates how a quantum multiverse of classical space-
time geometries emerges from (H,Ψ).
The model assumes a minisuperspace based on homogeneous, isotropic, spatially closed
spacetime geometries with metrics of the form
ds2 = −dt2 + a2(t)dΩ23. (4.1)
Here, a(t) is the scale factor and dΩ23 is the metric on a unit round 3-sphere.
8 For detail on observers, observations 1st and 3rd person probabilities and what’s included in D etc see
e.g.[19, 24].
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Dynamics: For a theory of dynamics (H) we assume Einstein gravity and a single homo-
geneous scalar field φ(t) moving in a potential V (φ). with the form:
V (φ) = Λ +
1
2
m2φ2 (4.2)
in the Planck units (h¯ = G = c = 1) that we use throughout. An action I[(a(t), φ(t)]
summarizes this dynamics but we won’t need its explicit form.
Quantum State: The NBWF is a function(al) of the geometry and field configurations on
a spacelike three-surface. In this minisuperspace model this means that the wave function
depends on the scale factor of the three surface and the homogeneous value of the scalar
field there. When used as arguments of the wave function we denote these by b and χ
respectively. Thus,
Ψ = Ψ(b, χ). (4.3)
In the semiclassical approximation the NBWF is a sum of terms of the form
Ψ(b, χ) ∝ exp[−I(b, χ)/h¯] (4.4)
where I(b, χ) is the action at a saddle point of the action I[(a(t), φ(t)] that is regular on a
four-disk and for which (a(t), φ(t)) assume the values (b, χ) on its boundary. These saddle
points are generally complex so we can write
Ψ(b, χ) ∝ exp{−[IR(b, χ) + iS(b, χ)]/h¯} (4.5)
where IR and −S are the real and imaginary parts respectively of the saddle point action.
In regions of (b, χ) where S varies rapidly compared to IR this wave function takes a
WKB form and predicts a multiverse of Lorentzian, classical histories obeying the Einstein
equation [25]. This classical multiverse consists of the the integral curves of S. That is, the
histories are the solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi expressions for the momenta pib and piχ
conjugate to b and χ, viz.
pib =
∂S
∂b
, piχ =
∂S
∂χ
. (4.6)
There turns out to be a one parameter family of such curves conveniently labeled by the
magnitude of the scalar field φ0 at the center of the saddle point geometry. The label φ0
turns out to be approximately equal to the initial value at which the field starts rolling down
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the potential in the classical history labeled by φ0. The probabilities of these histories are
approximately
p(φ0) ∝ exp[−2IR(φ0)/h¯], (4.7)
which, for this model, is approximately
p(φ0) ∝ exp
[
3pi
Λ + (1/2)m2φ20
]
. (4.8)
Thus, the theory (H,Ψ) predicts a quantum multiverse of classical spacetime geometries
and matter fields labeled by φ0 with probabilities (4.8). We can say that these are the
third person probabilities that the history labeled by φ0 was the history of the universe that
happened or occurred.
This multiverse does not provide a mechanism for the variation of Λ. There is only one
minimum characterized by one value of Λ and all the possible histories roll down to that. The
same is true for m which turns out to govern the size of the primordial density fluctuations
observed in the CMB [26].
1. Probabilities for Inflation
The number of e-folds of scalar field driven inflation Ne(φ0) is a simple example of a
quantity which, if not directly observable, has significant observable consequences for our
universe. Numerical solution of the equations (4.6) for the individual members of the mul-
tiverse of classical histories shows that approximately [27].
Ne(φ0) ≈ 3φ20/2 (4.9)
for φ0 >∼ 1 in the Planck units used throughout. The third person probabilities for (4.8)
show that histories with a low amount of inflation are the most probable to occur. But what
is most probable to occur is not necessarily the most probable for us to observe. Evaluating
(3.1) gives those probabilities.
From the definition of conditional probabilities (Bayes theorem) we have
p(φ0|D≥1) ∝ p(D≥1|φ0)p(φ0). (4.10)
Normalizing the right hand side gives a formula with an equality. In this simple model
of the observing situation 3rd person probabilities for what occurs are converted to 1st
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person probabilities for what is observed by multiplying by the factor p(D≥1|φ0) called the
‘top-down’ factor and then renormalizing.
The probability that there is at least one instance of our observational situation some-
where in the universe, p(D≥1|φ0) is bigger in a larger universe where there are more Hubble
volumes for an instance of D to have evolved than it is in a smaller universe where there are
fewer Hubble volumes. This turns out to mean that we are more likely to observe universes
with more inflation [28].
We can understand this result more quantitatively with a little model where p(D≥1|φ0)
can be explicitly evaluated. Suppose that our data D locate us somewhere on a homoge-
neous isotropic spacelike surface with Nh(φ0) Hubble volumes in each classical history. The
probability p(D≥1|φ0) is one minus the probability that there are no instances of D on the
surface. This in turn is the product of the probabilities 1−pE(D) that there are no instances
of D in any particular Hubble volume on the surface. The result is the formula:
p(D≥1|φ0) = 1− [1− pE(D)]Nh(φ0). (4.11)
Eq. (4.11) is an explicit formula for the ‘top-down factor’ that converts 3rd person probabil-
ities to first person ones as in (4.10). Larger number of Hubble volumes Nh make this factor
larger and closer and closer to 1. However small pE(D) is, in a sufficiently large universe the
probability is 1 that an instance of D occurs somewhere. When Nh  1/pE(D) first person
probabilities are equal to third person ones.
First person probabilities thus favor larger universes, larger φ0, with more e-folds for
inflation (4.9). In the quantum multiverse considered in this section significant inflation is
anthropically selected to be observed.
2. How this Model Supports the Conclusions
The main contribution of this model to our exposition is to illustrate in a simple way how
quantum multiverses of classical histories (including spacetime geometry) are predicted by
(H,Ψ). We will assume this for subsequent models. But the model does illustrate points (b)
and (c) of the Introduction, namely that quantum multiverses are a consequence of (H,Ψ)
and typically consist of many different histories not just one.
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FIG. 3: A potential for the scalar field with one false vacuum F and two true vacua A and B. The
false vacuum is separated from either true vacua by potential barriers and relatively flat patches
where the conditions for slow roll inflation are satisfied. The different shape of the barriers and of
the potential in the two slow roll regimes leading to the true vacua results in different false vacuum
decay rates and different predictions for CMB related observables in universes ending up in A or
B.
V. QUANTUM MULTIVERSES OF POCKET UNIVERSES
This section shows how pocket multiverses mentioned in the Introduction arise at vari-
ous levels of coarse graining from the NBWF (Ψ) and a dynamical theory (H) based on a
particular potential V (φ) like the one in Figure 3. This potential has three minima (vacua)
— two true vacua A and B and one false vacuum F . We can say that the potential de-
fines a landscape of vacua although there are only three here. As described in Section IV,
(H,Ψ) predicts a one parameter ensemble of classical histories labeled by the value at which
they start to roll down.
The classical history that starts to roll down at F in Figure 3 is a universe that inflates
with an effective cosmological constant 3pi/V (0). Classically this inflation is eternal — goes
on forever. But quantum mechanically regions of spacetime can tunnel through the barriers
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FIG. 4: The Penrose Diagram for the pocket multiverse model when the bubble nucleation rate is
low enough that collisions between bubbles are negligible. The blue (dark) region in the diagram
represents the false vacuum classical deSitter expansion. That deterministic classical evolution is
interrupted by the nucleation of bubbles of true vacuum in the false vacuum by quantum tunneling
which then expand at the speed of light. The bubbles nucleate at a point in the false vacuum and
their walls expand at the speed of light. There are two kinds of true vacuum A (yellow) and B
(green) corresponding to the two minima in the potential in Figure 3.
on either side of F and roll down classically to one of the true vacua A or B. That is, the
inflating background can nucleate bubbles of true vacuum A or B. The result is a multiverse
whose Penrose diagram is like the one in Fig 4 for low nucleation rates. Different histories
will have different numbers of true vacua of either kind in different places in the eternally
inflating universe.
We don’t live in the false vacuum devoid of matter. Rather we live in one of the bubbles
of true vacuum, either one of type A or of type B. The kind of bubble we live in can be
determined from observation. The value of the potential at the the minimum determines the
local value of the cosmological constant, either ΛA = V (φA) or ΛB = V (φB). Observations
of the expansion can in principle determine the cosmological constant in our bubble and
therefore determine which kind of bubble we are in. The curvatures of the potential at the
minima are related to the the amplitude of primordial density fluctuations which leave an
imprint on the CMB [26]. Different curvatures in at the minima of V produce observation-
ally distinct CMBA and CMBB. By observing the CMB which we can determine which
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FIG. 5: A history of the universe that is much coarser grained than the one in Figure 4. There is
only one bubble — our bubble. The mosaic of false vacuum A and B bubbles that are outside our
bubble suggested in Figure 4 is ignored and shaded gray. We stress that this does not mean there
are no regions of A, B, or F outside. Only that the coarse graining does not distinguish whether
a given region outside our bubble is A, B, or F .
kind bubble we are in.
This model supports several of the conclusions in the Introduction. It supplies a concrete
example of how certain (H,Ψ) implies a pocket multiverse that is realized as a false vac-
uum eternally inflating universe that nucleates bubbles of true vacuum (the pockets) with
different observational productions, In particular for a suitable potential it shows how the
cosmological constant can vary from bubble to bubble in space. This pocket universe is
not a choice nor postulate once an appropriate (H,Ψ) is fixed. Were ΛB too large to form
galaxies by as described in the Introduction we would immediately predict we are living in
a bubble of type A, That is a simple example of anthropic selection but we will have more
to say about this in the next section.
VI. A QUANTUM MULTIVERSE OF THE OBSERVABLE PROPERTIES OF
OUR BUBBLE
In the TSG model in Section II we showed how one quantum system can exhibit different
quantum multiverses at different levels of coarse graining. In this section we show how the
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model cosmology defined by the potential like that in Figure 3 can exhibit more than one
quantum multiverse at different levels of coarse graining.
A relatively fine-grained multiverse would consist of histories that describe all possible
configurations of bubble nucleation and non-nucleation at all places and all times. The
history illustrated in Figure 4 is just one example. But there are an infinite number of other
histories at this level of coarse graining in a false vacuum deSitter expansion that extends
to the infinite future.
The (3rd person) probabilities per unit four volume pA and pB for nucleating bubbles of
different kinds were calculated by Coleman and De Lucia (CDL) [29]. The probability per
unit four-volume to remain in the false vacuum is pF = 1−pA−pB. With these probabilities
it is possible to imagine calculating the third person probabilities for an entire set of histories
of different mosaics of volumes of false and true vacua. Some kind of cutoff or ‘measure’
would be required to deal with the infinite volume. Even then it would be a formidable
calculation.
We do not observe entire four-dimensional histories of roiling seas of bubble nucleation
extending to the infinite future. Neither do we know the location of our bubble. First
person probabilities for our observations, say of the CMB, are the probabilities that we
are in a bubble of type A or B at some unknown location in the eternally inflating false
vacuum spacetime. Such probabilities could in principle be calculated by summing the
probabilities for the fine-grained histories over the all the alternative structures outside our
bubble. Quantum mechanics provides a more direct route to the answer: Make predictions
for our observations using a quantum multiverse based on a much coarser grained multiverse
that follows what goes on inside our bubble and ignores everything outside — a multiverse
based on our bubble.
A history in our bubble multiverse is illustrated in Figure 5. Our bubble occupies one
part of the spacetime with (CDL) probabilities pA or pB that it is of type A or B. Since
the coarse-graining doesn’t specify what is going on in the volumes outside our bubble their
contribution to the probability of this coarse-grained history is pA + pB + pF = 1.
Suppose the data D describing our observational situation locate us on the spacelike
reheating surface inside one of these kinds of bubbles. There are an infinite number of
Hubble volumes on these surfaces in both kinds of bubble. The top-down factor (4.11)
connecting 1st and 3rd person probabilities is then unity. 1st person probabilities equal 3rd
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person probabilities. Thus, the probabilities that we observe A, p(WOA) or B p((WOB)
are
p(WOA) =
pA
pA + pB
, p(WOB) =
pB
pA + pB
(6.1)
It doesn’t matter where in spacetime our bubble is located. CDL probabilities respect the
symmetries of deSitter space and are the same at all locations.
This example illustrates that a quantum system like our universe is not described by only
one quantum multiverse. It is described by many different ones at different levels of coarse
graining within the same theory (H,Ψ) with the same potential in Figure 3. For a given
question it’s generally best to use the coarsest grained description that supplies an answer
to it.
This model supports all of the conclusions (a)-(f) mentioned in the Introduction (a)
Different quantum multiverses follow from (H,Ψ) at different levels and kinds of coarse
graining. (b) They emerged by calculation from (H,Ψ)with the potential in Fig 3. They
were not an assumption beyond assuming (H,Ψ). (c.) The coarse graining following the
alternatives A, B, or F for all volumes in spacetime leads to quantum multiverse with a
truly vast number of histories to compute third person probabilities for. The coarse graining
following only the inside of our bubble and ignoring everything outside has only alternatives
A or B. Either way there is a multiplicity of alternative histories. (d.) Anthropic selection
automatically ruled out an observation of a false vacuum F devoid of matter where we
cannot exist. (f.) The simplicity of coarse graining multiverses by summing amplitudes
rather than summing probabilities.
A. Different Dynamics, Different Multiverses
Our story about pocket universes forming by the decay of an eternally inflating false
vacuum depended crucially on a dynamical theory (H) incorporating something like the po-
tential in Figure 3. This dependence on dynamical theory is illustrated in work by Hawking
and Hertog [30]. They use the no-boundary quantum state (Ψ) together with a dynamics
(H) specified by an effective dual field theory defined on the exit surface of eternal inflation.
This dual field theory provides a description of the transition between the essentially quan-
tum realm of eternal inflation to the ensemble of possible classical universes one of which we
observe. It provides a quantum probabilistic measure on this ensemble that is different from
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FIG. 6: A potential V (φ) for the scalar field with many minima at field values φK ,K = 1, 2, · · · .
The values of the field at the minima define different values of the cosmological constant ΛK =
V (φK). The first person probability that we observe one value Λ or another is the probability that
our past history rolled down to one minimum or another.
the one in Section VI. Hawking and Hertog find that this measure predicts a smooth exit
from eternal inflation with no bubbles and no pocket universes. Evidently this dynamics
is not represented by a an effective dynamical theory incorporating a potential like that in
Figure 3.
VII. A QUANTUM MULTIVERSE OF HOMOGENEOUS AND ISOTROPIC
CLASSICAL HISTORIES WITH DIFFERENT PHYSICAL CONSTANTS
.
The potential on which this model is based is shown in Figure 6. It has many minima
(vacua) K = 1, 2, · · · at values φK near which it is approximately
V (φ) ≈ ΛK + 1
2
m2K(φ− φK)2 + · · · (7.1)
for constants ΛK and mK — defining a landscape of vacuua.
25
FIG. 7: Anthropic constraints on the values of Q and Λ in a figure from [3] based on calculations
in Tegmark, et. al. [31] given the present age of the universe.
This potential defines a one parameter ensemble of alternative homogenous and isotropic
classical histories that may roll down to one minimum or another. The theory (H,Ψ) supplies
3rd person probabilities for which minimum is reached. The ensemble is thus a quantum
multiverse in which the constants Λ and m are the same everywhere in space but vary from
history to history. Their value is thus not fixed by the action but by the quantum accident
of which one of the minima is reached.
As observers of the universe we are a special kind of late time fluctuation away from
homogeneity and isotropy living in one of the true vacua after reheating has produced
ordinary matter. The values of Λ and m that we observe are the values for our minima.
The parameter m is related to the amplitude Q of primordial density fluctuations when
they leave their horizon. The relation turns out to be roughly Q ≈ m in the Planck units
employed throughout. The 1st person probability that we observe particular values of Λ
and Q is a probability that our past history rolled down to a minimum with these values9.
9 The approximate Copenhagen quantum mechanics of measured subsystems would not be able to give us
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FIG. 8: The marginal probability distribution for observations of the the cosmological constant
obtained essentially by integrating the 1st person probabilities (7.2) over Q
.
In Section IV 1 we described how the transition between 3rd person probabilities for
which history occurs and 1st person probabilities for which history is observed favors larger
universes where there are more places of us to be and disfavors smaller universes. The
history that dominates the 1st person probabilities for observation turns out to be the one
with the lowest φ0 consistent with significant inflation. In more technical terms 1st person
probabilities are dominated by the lowest exit from eternal inflation. As explained in Section
IV 1 for large universes with many Hubble volumes the top-down factor (4.11) is unity and
1st person and 3rd person probabilities are equal.
As mentioned before it turns out that m ≈ Q so the 1st person probabilities for Λ and
Q then are approximately from (4.8)
p(1p)(Λ, Q) ≈ exp
(
3pi
Λ + cQ
)
. (7.2)
where c is a calculable dimensionless constant of order unity.
these probabilities because it cannot generally retrodict the past (e.g [21]). A generalization like DH is
necessary to do that.
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Conditioning on at least one instance of a small amount of our data on the scales of
the Earth turns out to be sufficient to derive (7.2). We can then use this result to look
for predictions of correlations between the rest of our data on scales of our Hubble volume.
To illustrate this we look for correlations among three pieces of our data: the value of Λ,
the value of Q , and the fact that we have a Hubble volume full of galaxies by the present
age of approximately 14Gyr. The range of values of Λ and Q for which these conditions
can satisfied as calculated in [31] and displayed in Figure 7. As noted by [1, 2], too large a
Λ would prevent proto-galaxies from collapsing. Too large a Q would result in a universe
where most collapses produce black holes. Were Q too small the fluctuations would not
grow enough for galaxies to form by the present age. These anthropic constraints mean that
the probability is negligible that we are outside the white region in Figure 7.
Inside the white region the NBWF 1st person probabilities (7.2) favor small values of Q
and larger values of log10Λ. Thus we predict the values indicated by the red ∗
Q ∼ 10−5, Λ ∼ 10−123 (7.3)
Figure 8 shows the marginal distribution for Λ.
The few orders of magnitude agreement of the values in (7.3) with observations is not the
main point. After all this is just one example out of many possible ones. Rather the main
things the reader should take away is the following: First, the universe does not have to have
pockets for the fundamental constants to vary. As here, there can be quantum multiverses
of homogeneous and isotropic histories in which the constants do not vary in space but over
a multiverse of histories. Second, anthropic selection is automatic in quantum cosmology
through 1st person probabilities for observations. And finally, a theory of the quantum
state has a significant impact on what the probabilities are and for our predictions of the
1st person probabilities of the constants we observe.
VIII. A QUANTUM MULTIVERSE OF HISTORIES WITH DIFFERENT CMBS
In the preceding section’s calculation of 1st person probabilities for observation only
the potential in Figure 3 below the lowest exits from eternal inflation contributed to the
final result. The potential is thus effectively equivalent to an ensemble of one dimensional
potentials each with one minimum.
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String theory has a vast landscape of possible vacua [32]. A landscape with many fields
moving in an ensemble of one-dimensional potentials each with one minimum is probably
more analogous to the string landscape than one potential with many minima of the kind
in Figure 3. Thomas Hertog used such a model landscape consisting of a number of one
dimensional potentials for (H) together with the no-boundary wave function for (Ψ) to
estimate that theory’s prediction for the tensor/scalar ratio in the CMB [10]. For a model
landscape he took the scalar field potentials that were used to reduce data from the Planck
satellite on the CMB [33]. That landscape included power law potentials of the form V (φ) =
λφn, plateau potentials of the form V (φ) = V0(1− φn/µ) and ‘R2 inflation potentials’. The
quantum multiverse consists of all the histories in all the potentials. The most probable
1st person history is the one with the lowest exit from eternal inflation among all these
potentials.
Hertog’s results are shown in Figure 9. The important point about the model is not the
specific numerical value for the tensor/scalar ratio but the fact that they are a prediction
for observations yet to be done. If further observations yield different numbers then either
the NBWF is ruled out or the ad hoc landscape of potentials would be ruled out.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
At the start of this paper we defined a multiverse as an ensemble of alternative possible
situations only one of which is observed by us. We have seen how decoherent histories quan-
tum mechanics (DH) predicts quantum cosmological multiverses in the form of decoherent
sets of alternative coarse grained histories of the universe. In each set one history occurs,
or happens, with a probability predicted by a fundamental quantum theory of cosmology
consisting of theories of the universe’s quantum state (Ψ) and dynamics (H). Quantum
multiverses are not some posited speculative idea to be grafted onto the basic theory. They
are the output of that theory.
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FIG. 9: Planck satellite results for the tensor/scalar ratio r and the scalar spectral tilt ns of the
observed CMB as compared with various theories. The figure was adapted by Thomas Hertog
from Figure 1 of [33]. The shaded regions show the values consistent with the data when combined
with other astronomical measurements. The predicted curves are predictions from various kinds
of models. The NBWF plus the landscape of potentials discussed in the text and labeled at right
predicts the values indicated roughly by the arrow.
A. General Conclusions
Conclusions that follow from general perspective of this paper have been stated at several
points in this paper but we repeat them here in abbreviated form10.
a. Many Quantum Multiverses. The theory (H,Ψ) does not just predict one multiverse
of alternative histories. It predicts many different multiverses at different levels and kinds
of coarse graining. The pocket multiverse is just one example.
10 Many years ago John Wheeler explained to the young author that some people only read the introduction,
some people only read the conclusions, and some people only read the figure captions, so your message
should be in all of those places.
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b. Multiverses are Not a Choice. Quantum multiverses are not a choice or an assumption
separate from the theory (H,Ψ). They follow or do not follow from (H,Ψ). If you have
some prior objection to multiverses of some kind then restrict to theories (H,Ψ) that don’t
imply them.
c. Multiverses are Generic. Simple, manageable, discoverable (H,Ψ)’s generically predict
quantum multiverses consisting of an ensemble of many possible histories together with
probabilities for which one occurs. If the ensemble consisted of just one history with certainty
all of present complexity would have to be encoded (H,Ψ).
d. Anthropic Selection is Automatic. Anthropic selection is an automatic consequence of
first person quantum mechanical probabilities for observations (Section II C 1). Probabilities
for our observations are conditioned on a description of our observational situation and we
won’t observe what is where we cannot exist.
e. Different Mechanisms for the Variation of Constants. In different quantum multiverses
constants like Λ can be constant in each history but very from history to history, or can
vary in space within every history. Automatic anthropic selection is enabled in either case.
f. Two Routes to Coarse-Graining. Quantum multiverses are restricted to sets of alterna-
tive coarse grained histories that are decoherent — that have negligible quantum interference
between individual histories in a set. Further coarse graining can be carried out either by
summing probabilities or by summing quantum amplitudes. That is a considerable compu-
tational advantage.
Understanding quantum multiverses as decoherent sets of alternative coarse-grained his-
tories of the universe provides a unified perspective on different notions of multiverse that
have been discussed. As in the two-slit models in Section II it includes the multiverses that
describe the possible outcomes of laboratory experiment. As in Section V and VI it includes
a quantum picture of pocket universes at different levels of coarse graining. As in Sections
VII and VIII it provides a notion of a multiverse in which constants vary in a way that is
different from pocket multiverses.
B. How Specific Models Support the General Conclusions
Sections V-VIII exhibited five quantum cosmological models that illustrate the different
kinds of quantum multiverse that follow from an (H,Ψ)’s consisting the no-boundary quan-
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tum state of the universe Ψ and dynamical theories H based general relativity coupled to
a single scalar field moving in different potentials. These models are of course consistent
with the general conclusions above as are the two-slit models in Section II. But they also
illustrate the following specific consequences:
• How pocket (bubble) multiverses universes emerge from some dynamical theories (H,Ψ)
like the one in Section V but not from others like the ones in Sections IV and VI.
•. How the same theory (H,Ψ) can predict multiverses at vastly different levels of coarse
graining like the multiverse of true vacuum bubbles in Section V and the multiverse of
possibilities for our bubble in Section VI.
•. How to use appropriate coarse grainings implemented by summing amplitudes rather
than probabilities to make manageable predictions for our observations even when the large
scale structure of the universe is a complex roiling sea of false vacuum bubbles in an ever
expanding sea of false vacuum as in Section VI.
• How deterministic classical physics emerges from (H,Ψ) as a quantum multiverse of
histories with high probability for ones exhibiting correlations in time by deterministic laws
like the Einstein equation as in Section IV.
• How a landscape potential with many minima leads to different possible values of the
cosmological constant and how first person probabilities implement anthropic restrictions
for values we will observe as in Section VII
• How a landscape of effective potentials leads to testable predictions for features of the
CMB as in Section VIII.
Quantum multiverses are what a fundamental theory (H,Ψ) predicts. It is through them
that we understand our universe. As Weinberg wrote: “Most advances in the history of
science have been marked by discoveries about nature, but at certain turning points we have
made discoveries about science itself”. The quantum multiverses of the universe are one of
these turning points.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Murray Gell-Mann, Stephen Hawking, Thomas Hertog, and Mark
Srednicki for discussions on the quantum mechanics of the universe over many years. He
thanks Bernard Carr, George Ellis, and Thomas Hertog for useful conversations, for critical
32
readings of the manuscript, and for supplying relevant references. He thanks David Krakauer
and Steven Benner for discussions on experimental evolution. He thanks Thomas Hertog
for permission to reproduce Fig 9. He thanks the Santa Fe Institute for supporting many
productive visits there. This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation
under grant PHY15-04541.
Appendix A: A FAQ for Discussion
There has been much discussion of cosmological multiverses by many authors. Some
works known to the author (but not necessarily read carefully by the author) are [34–46].
This FAQ addresses concerns that have been raised in some of these articles about whether a
quantum multiverse is falsifiable, testable, predictive, real, and scientific. No claim is made
to cover all of the issues that have been raised or to review all the discussion that has taken
place. This FAQ is separated from the main discussion because it reflects the opinions of
the author more than the results of calculation.
The quantum multiverse framework for prediction presented here is a synthesis of many
elements. These include a quantum mechanics for the universe (DH), a model of observers,
for example the one in IV 1, a theory of the universe’s quantum state (Ψ), and a dynamical
theory (H) expressed in particular variables, perhaps defining a landscape of vacua, etc.
Is the notion of a quantum multiverse of the universe falsifiable? Yes. As in every other
theory in physics this one can be falsified by falsifying any of the elements mentioned above
that went into its construction. Take, for example DH. There is overwhelming evidence for
quantum multiverses on laboratory scales. But there is little evidence that the same quantum
mechanics (DH) can be extrapolated to the scales of cosmology as has been assumed in this
paper. Suppose quantum laboratory experiment shows that DH is false on some intermediate
scale. Then DH would be falsified. Similarly with the other elements of the predictive
framework: a dynamical theory, a quantum state, a landscape for the variation of constants,
etc.
Are quantum multiverses of the universe testable? Yes. A theory like (H,Ψ) is testable
by the (1st person) probabilities it predicts for the outcomes of observations. These are
probabilities supplied by (H,Ψ) conditioned on a description of our observational situa-
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tion11. Ideally we would test the theory with situations where the predicted probabilities
are near 1. If a prediction with probability near 1 does not occur the theory is falsified. But
this luxury is seldom accessible in environmental sciences like geology, planet formation, bio-
logical evolution, human history, and cosmology. Rather we judge the success of a theory by
its successful prediction of correlations among our present data as in the example in Section
VII and Section VIII. (For more on criteria for success see, e.g. [3].) Hertog’s prediction of
the tensor/scalar ratio in the CMB described Section VIII provides a clear example. If the
observed ratio is much different from the predicted one then either the landscape is wrong,
the state is wrong, or the framework of quantum prediction is wrong.
Something like a cosmological multiverses might be directly testable by experiment if a
very large spacetime volume could be prepared with an initial quantum state from which
galaxies, stars, life etc would emerge over billions of years. This is quite beyond human
powers at present. But the laws of the universe do not have to be such as to make it easy
for some negligible bits of protoplasm to test them directly on the scales that happen to be
accessible to them at the moment.
Are other histories in the multiverse of alternatives observable? No. The
different histories are exclusive alternatives. We are not outside the universe observing the
whole ensemble, but rather inside it participating in the superposition. A live Schro¨dinger
cat does not observe a dead cat. There are six alternative outcomes to the roll of a die each
with a probability of 1/6. We observe the one face that comes up. We do not observe the
alternative outcomes of that one roll.
Is the quantum multiverse of the universe real? Yes. It is a tenet of many Everettian
formulations of quantum theory for closed systems that all the histories in a given multiverse
are real [4, 6]. Further, all the other multiverses based on different variables with different
levels of coarse graining are real. There are also formulations of DH in which only one
history occurs in a multiverse of possible ones real [47]. For more of the author’s more
nuanced views on what’s real see [48, 49].
Are there other areas of science with similar issues? Yes. Biological evolution is
concerned with the multiverse of different histories of the origin of species. Individual
11 In various works we have called these top-down or first person probabilities. For more on this see [8].
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FIG. 10: A single history of biological evolution in a coarse graining that only distinguishes certain
genera [50]. In this representation time roughly starts at ‘root’ and proceeds outward. Different
genera branch into others due to the accidents of biological evolution — mutation, recombination,
genetic drift, extinction, etc. This is just one history of how the genera might have been formed.
The evolutionary multiverse consists of all the different possible trees like this one representing
different ways that the branching structure could have happened. We do not directly observe any
of this history. It’s in the past. Yet we believe in the multiverse of biological evolution because it
explains regularities between species that we observe today.
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histories can be illustrated by familiar tree diagrams like the example in Figure 10. Differ-
ent evolutionary histories correspond to different branching trees. In principle the theory
(H,Ψ) predicts probabilities for these various trees to occur but these are much beyond our
ability to compute at present. We do not observe directly (‘see’) any of the histories of
this multiverse. They are in our past. Yet we believe that biological evolution happened
because it is explains regularities today. For example plausible reconstructions of the evo-
lutionary multiverse explain the similarities between species today. Those similarities are
consequences of frozen accidents of evolution — chance events whose consequences prolif-
erated. The theory of this multiverse is based on a number of elements: Genetic variation
by mutation, genetic drift, or recombination; a fitness landscape of ecological niches; an ini-
tial condition of primordial DNA synthesis. This is testable in a limited way by controlled
laboratory experiment [51, 52]. Other historical sciences such as geology, planet formation,
human history etc. provide similar examples of multiverses. In cosmology we do not observe
big bang nucleosynthesis directly but we believe that it happened in the past because of its
successful prediction of the correlations in the abundance of the elements observed today.
Are quantum multiverses a departure from laboratory physics? No Laboratory
experiments are inside the universe not somehow outside it. Laboratory experiments can
therefore be described by highly coarse grained alternative histories of the universe. The
highly successful Copenhagen formulation of quantum mechanics is not an alternative to DH
but an approximation to it that is appropriate for measurement situations [18]. Quantum
cosmology is not in conflict with the successes in the laboratory.
But Copenhagen quantum mechanics must be generalized beyond the the laboratory
to apply the early universe where no measurements were being made and no observers
were around to carry them out. DH, the generalization used here, is not a departure from
Copenhagen quantum mechanics where it applies but rather a generalization of it to new
domains of applicability. Some generalization is inevitable for cosmology and various ones
been studied since the time of Everett.
Cosmology is a historical science like geology, biological evolution, and human history. Its
aim is to use that data that exists now to reconstruct the quantum past in order to simplify
the prediction of the future (e.g.[21]). We should not be surprised that the extension of
observation to new domains of phenomena require new extensions of existing theory.
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Are quantum multiverses scientific. Yes, in the author’s opinion: As sketched above,
in many areas of science one finds multiverses of the kind mentioned in the introduction —
an ensemble of possible situations only one of which is observed by us.
Appendix B: A Little More DH
In this Appendix we repeat much of the qualitative discussion of the two slit models in
Section II with more equations. That may helpful to some readers.
The inputs to the prediction of a quantum multiverse are the HamiltonianH and quantum
state |Ψ(t)〉 of the particles in the boxes. This is a function of time in the Schro¨dinger picture
in which we work. The state of the electron can also be described by a wave function in
configuration space, viz.
Ψ = Ψ(x, y, t) (B1)
using a coordinate x for the horizontal direction and y for the vertical direction in the three
boxes as shown in Figure 1 and assuming symmetry in the perpendicular direction. We move
back and forth between wave functions like (B1) and bras and kets like |Ψ(t)〉 as convenient.
Histories can be represented by quantum branch state vectors constructed from (H,Ψ).
For an example take the TSS model. Denote the initial state at time t0 by Ψ(x, y, t0). This
is a product of wave packet in the x-direction φ(x, t0) and a wave function ψ0(y, t0) localized
at the gun, viz.
Ψ(x, y, t0) = ψ(y, t0)φ(x, t0) (B2)
This wave function evolves in time by the Schro¨dinger equation
ih¯
∂Ψ
∂t
= HΨ. (B3)
We assume that φ(x, t) is a narrow wave packet peaked to the left of the slits but moving
to the right so as to reach the slits at time ts and the detecting screen at td. Thus, its progress
in x recapitulates evolution in time. After passing through the slits the wave function has
the approximate form
Ψ(x, y, t) = ψU(y, t)φ(x, t) + ψL(y, t)φ(x, t), ts < t < td. (B4a)
≡ ΨU(x, y, t) + ΨL(x, y, t). (B4b)
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Here, in the first term ψU(y, t) is localized near the upper slit at time ts and spreads over
a larger region of y by the time td that the electron hits the detecting screen. Similarly for
the second term. The last line defines branch wave functions ΨU(x, y, t) and ΨL(x, y, t) for
the two histories in the set.
Simple two-slit model (TSS): The electron starts localized at the gun. The alternative
position intervals Y at the further screen defines a coarse grained set of alternative coarse-
grained histories of the electron between the times t0 and td. If {PY } are a complete set
of orthogonal projections on these intervals the branch state vectors for these histories are
|ΨY (td)〉 ≡ PY |Ψ(td)〉. The probability to arrive at Y predicted from (H,Ψ) is
p(Y ) = ||PY |Ψ(td)〉||2 = |||ΨY (td)〉||2. (B5)
A finer grained set of histories for TSS would also specify whether the electron passed
through the the upper slit U or the lower slit L on its way to a given interval Y . Naively one
might expect that the probabilities pU(Y ) and pL(Y ) that the electron the upper or lower
slit respectively and arrived at Y would be, from (B4b),
pU(Y ) = ||PY |ΨU(td)〉||2, pL(Y ) = ||PY |ΨL(td)〉||2 (B6)
Then we would have from (B4b) and (B5)
p(Y ) = ||PY |ΨU(td)〉+ PY |ΨL(td〉||2 = ||PY |ΨU(td)〉||2 + ||PY |ΨU(td)〉|||2 (B7)
This is false unless the two branches PY |ΨU(td)〉 and PY |ΨL(td〉 are orthogonal so that the
quantum interference between them vanishes. That is, it is inconsistent unless the set of
histories decoheres.
〈ΨU(td)|PY |ΨL(td)〉 ≈ 0 (B8)
That won’t be the case in TSS. The two histories interfere as shown by interference pattern
that is a characteristic feature of the two slit experiment. TSS does not have a multiverse
of this kind.
Two-slit model with gas (TSG): The TSG model contains a gas of particles that interact
weakly with the electron — an example of an environment. The initial wave function is
Ψ(x, y, t0) = ψ(y, t0)φ(x, t0)χ(t0), t0 < t < ts. (B9)
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where χ(t0) is the initial state of all the particles in the gas. After passing through the slits
this becomes
Ψ(x, y, t) = ψU(y, t)φ(x, t)χU(t) + ψL(y, t)φ(x, t)χL(t), ts < t < td. (B10a)
≡ ΨU(x, y, t) + ΨL(x, y, t). (B10b)
where χU(t) and χL(t) denote the state of the gas particles that have scattered from the
region of the upper and lower slit respectively. Then ΨU(x, y, td) and ΨL(x, y, td) are the
branch wave functions for the two histories that the electron arrived in Y at time td after
passing through either the upper or lower slit.
In the simple two-slit model (TSS) the set of alternative histories describing which slit
(U or L) the electron went through on its way to arrive at Y on the further screen did not
decohere as required for a quantum multiverse. That was because the states representing the
two histories were not orthogonal. However, because of the gas in (TSG) the two histories do
decohere. The decoherence condition (B8) is satisfied because the state of the gas scattered
from the upper slit |χU〉 is orthogonal to the state of the gas scattered from the lower slit
|χL〉 if enough particles scatter.
To see that gas ensures this orthogonality consider a single gas particle a whose initial
state is |χa〉 that scatters near the upper slit will be in a final state SU |χa〉 where SU is the
S-matrix for scattering near the upper slit. Similarly for the lower slit with SL|χa〉 If N gas
particles scatter the overlap between |χU〉 and |χL〉 will be proportional to N inner products
of the form
N∏
a=1
|〈χa|S†USL|χa〉|. (B11)
Since the two final state vectors SU |χa〉 and SL|χa〉 are different each individual product has
a magnitude less than 1. The product of a very large number of such products will be near
zero implying decoherence.
Thus for TSG we have exhibited two quantum multiverses at different levels of coarse
graining. The first one (just Y ) is a coarse graining of the second (Y and S). The first
ignores the gas, the second follows it.
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